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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
INC., a CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
HENRY E. WEST, JR., d/b/a
SKYLINE AIR TAXI COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10928

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The action in the lower Court was brought by the assignee of a written contract who commenced suit against
Defendant for breach of said contract and for Defendant's
insufficient funds check.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A Default Judgment was granted against Defendant in
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The
Defendant moved to set the Default Judgment aside. The
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said Court, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow presiding,
denied the motion.
The Appellant-Defendant seeks to have the Default
Judgment set aside and be granted opportunity to present
his defense which he believes to be meritorious and legally
sufficient.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
After commencement of the Plaintiff's action in the
spring of 1965, Defendant engaged James A. Murphy of
Salt Lake City, Utah, as his counsel. Plaintiff was represented by Robert M. McRae of Salt Lake City, Utah. McRae
withdrew as counsel for Plaintiff on or about October 13,
1965, and Ephraim H. Fankhauser became counsel for Plaintiff. Murphy entered Defendant's answer to Plaintiff's Complaint about February 4, 1966.
Fankhauser served Interrogartories on Defendant
about October 10, 1966. Three days later, on October 13,
1966, Murphy withdrew as counsel for Defendant and so
notified Fankhauser and sent notice of his withdrawal to
Defendant at Defendant's last business address, 530 East
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant had, however,
previously terminated his employment at that address and
did not receive the notice, and had not receved it or the Interrogatories prior to November 28, 1966. Plaintiff's counsel, Fankhauser, who knew that Defendant's counsel,
Murphy, had withdrawn, did not send Defendant a written
notice requiring Defendant to appoint another counsel or

appear in person as required by statue. U.C.A. 78-51-36
(1953).
Without further notice or communication to Defendant,
E. H. Fankhauser, on or about November 16, 1966, filed a
Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and enter a Default
Judgment against Defendant and a Notice of Hearing on
said motion. The ground for said motion was that Defendant
had not answered the said Interrogatories of October 10,
1966. Fankhouser mailed a copy of said motion and notice
to 530 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, which was
the address at which Defendant had been previously only an
employee, but from which Defendant had then moved and
the copy of motion and notice was never delivered or forwarded to Defendant.
On November 28, 1966, the Third District Court, the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson presiding, made an order
striking Defendant's answer and granting Default Judgment
against Defendant. The said Judgment provides for punitive damages inasmuch as Plaintiff's Complaint prays for
such damage. Neither Defendant nor his counsel were present at these proceedings and were wholly ignorant of the
action at that time. Defendant engaged other counsel,
Stephen M. Hadley, who after learning about the Default
Judgment, on December 20, 1966, contacted E. H. Fankhauser who agreed in writing to stipulate that the Court
could set the Default Judgment aside.
Defendant's counsel accordingly prepared a stipulation
as per the above said agreement to set the Default aside, but
on January 9, 1967, E. H. Fankhauser notified Stephen M.
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Hadley that Fankhauser's client, the Plaintiff, would not
allow him to so stipulate. Defendant's counsel then filed a
motion to set the Default Judgment aside, which motion was
heard by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, on May 4, 1967.
The said Court denied the motion.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN NOT SETTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
ASIDE WHEN IT WAS INFORMED THAT PLAINTIFF
HAD NOT DEMANDED THAT DEFENDANT APPOINT
NEW COUNSEL OR APPEAR IN PERSON AS PLAINTIFF WAS REQUIRED TO DO BY A MANDATORY
STATUTE 'WHEN PLAINTIFF KNEW THAT DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL HAD PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN.
Section 78-51-36 U.C.A. (1953) reads as follows:
When an attorney ... seases to act as such, a party
to an action or proceeding for whom he was acting
as attorney must before any further proceedings are
had against him be required by the adverse party by
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in person.
The obvious intent of the statute is to prevent one party
who is represented by counsel from taking unjust advantage
of the other party who may believe that he is also represented by counsel when in fact he is not, or who may be

5
ignorant of necessary legal procedure. In other words, the
statute requires the one party to notify the other prior to
taking further action. There is no specific requirements as
to the type or form of the notice except that it be written.
Certainly this is not such an onerous burden that its neglect
can be excused in view of its obvious benefit to a party who
may be ignorant of his rights and proper legal procedure or
who may be ignorant that he is not then represented. Moreover, such notice would be of advantage to the one giving it
in that it would add some invulnerability to a Judgment
obtained after giving such notice.
In the instant case it is without contradiction that the
Plaintiff did not give Defendant the required notice and
that Defendant was wholly ignorant of the default hearing.
Defendant states in his affidavit that he in fact did not
have notice of the hearing and that he had not then received
or heard of the interrogatories upon which the judgment
was based. In addition, Defendant has previously moved
from the address to which the copies of said motion and
hearing were sent and said papers were never sent or forwarded on to Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel had
received the notice that Defendant's former counsel had
withdrawn more than one month previous to the sending of
the copy of said motion for default judgment.
This case clearly appears to be one to which the statute
was designed to apply. It is submitted that the lower court
erred in not ruling that default judgment was not proper
when it appeared that the Plaintiff had not complied with
the above statute.
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POINT II.
THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN SUSTAINING AWARD OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN ABSENCE OF PROOF THEREOF WHEN
IT UPHELD DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE THE SAME AS EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES WHICH MUST BE PROVED.
The plaintiff's Second Cause of Action includes a prayer for punitive damages based on an allegation of Defendant's fraud. Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
section (b) (2) requires the court to take proof of the value
of a claim for unliquidated damages. It is submitted that attorney fees, punitive or exemplary damages, or defination of
unliquidated damages. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 Pac.
908, requires the court to take proof of unliquidated
damages.
Although there are very few cases found on this point,
the Colorado Supreme Court in Valdez v. Sams, 307 P.2d
189, 191 ( 1957), stated that
Exemplary damages . . . cannot be awarded in the
absence of a specific finding, based upon evidence,
that the special circumstances which warrant the
extraordinary remedy were in fact present.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is submitted that the
rule as laid down by the Colorado Court is good law and is
consistent with the rule laid down by this Court in the Hurd
case.
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POINT Ill.
THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN FAILING TO SET DEF'AULT JUDGMENT
ASIDE BASED ON DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES BECAUSE
SUCH GROUND IS TECHNICAL RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIAL.
This Court has many times stated that Default judgments should be set aside if justice requires. In McKean v.
Mountain View Memorial Estates, 17 Utah 2d 323, 325, 411
P.2d 128 (1966), the Court stated that
it is the policy of the law to favor a trial on the
merits and to afford both sides a full opportunity to
present their evidence and contentions as to disputed
issues so they may be disposed of on substantial rather than on technical grounds.
In this case the counsel for Plaintiff agreed to set the Default Judgment aside, but then later refused to honor his
agreement on the ground that his client, the Plaintiff, would
not allow him to do so. Further, it is without contradiction
that Defendant's present counsel acted with reasonable dispatch to protect Defendant's rights after he was engaged by
Defendant. The Plaintiff's counsel was aware that Defendant might not have received notice of the motion for Judgment and the Notice of Hearing of the same, and said counsel also knew that Defendant's former counsel had withdrawn.
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It is also without dispute that Defendant had not received the Interrogatories on which the judgment was based.
Thus, it would seem that such a ground for a Default Judgment is technical and not substantial and therefore is in
direct opposition to this Court's avowed policy.

POINT IV.
THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN FAILING TO SET DEF AULT JUDGMENT
ASIDE \VHEN DEFENDANT TESTIFIED BY AFFIDAVIT THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT IN FACT HAVE
NOICE OR KNOWLEDGE OF DEFAULT HEARING.
It is uncontracicted that Defendant did not have knowledge of the notice of the Default hearing nor of the hearing
itself, and that he was not represented by counsel at the
time. Moreover, it is clear that Plaintiff's counsel had knowledge of these facts. Since Defendant's Affidavit stands uncontradicted the Court must conclude that notice by the Defendant was not in fact received and since an answer was
previously interposed, Default Judgment was clearly
improper.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower Court not to set the Judgment
aside is manifest error and should be reversed in the inter-
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ests of justice to allow the Defendant to have his day in
Court and present evidence which he feels is meritorious and
legally sufficient.
Respectfully submitted,
RIGTRUP, HADLEY, LIVINGSTON & NEWMAN
Stephen M. Hadley
530 East Fifth South, Suite No. 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Counsel for Appellant
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of the defendant and was never returned to plaintiff~s
counsel thus giving rise to the presumption that defendant did, in fact, have notice. It is also uncontradicted
that the Notice of Default Judgment mailed to the def cndant at his last known address, 530 East 5th South,
Salt Lake City, Utah was, in fact, received by defendant.
The record clearly supports the action of the trial court
and the judgment against the defendant was proper
as well as the denial of defendants motion to set aside the
judgment.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower Court denying defendant's
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was proper for plaintiff was under no requirement to serve notice upon
defendant to appoint new counsel or in the alternative,
to appear in person, for the withdrawal of his former
attorney was a voluntary withdrawal, and not a withdrawal contemplated under the provisions of 78-51-36,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the record before the
Court at the time of hearing of defendant's Motion to
Set Aside the Judgment was sufficient to sustain the
Judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff against defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
E. H. Fankhauser
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Counsel for Respondant
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of the trial court in granting the judgment against defendant and denying the Motion of the defendant to set
the judgment aside.
POINT IV.
LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF AGAINST DEFENDANT WHERE
SUCH MOTION WAS BASED UPON THE AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT, THAT DEFENDANT
HAD NO NOTICE OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEF AULT HEARING.

Defendant in his Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment of plaintiff against defendant based such motion on the failure of plaintiff to comply with the provisions of Section 78-51-36 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The withdrawal of defendant's counsel, Mr. Murphy, was
voluntary and not a withdrawal contemplated or within
the meaning of the statute relied upon by the defendant
in the bringing of his motion to set the judgment aside.
Further, the defendant admitted in his affidavit in support of his motion that he received the notice of withdrawal of Mr. Murphy. Under these circumstances the
lower court had no alternative but to deny defendant's
motion absent a showing of abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in granting the default judgment,
or that the action of the trial court was not supported
by the record.
It is uncontradicted that the Motion of Plaintiff to
take Default Judgment against the defendant and Notice
of Hearing thereon was mailed to the last known address
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the answer of the defendant and entering a Default
Judgment against defendant, and did so properly.
In Titcker Realty Inc., t'. Nunley, lG U. (2d) 97, 396
Pac. 2d 410 (19G4) this court stated as follows:
"We first note the basic premisf~ on appeal: that
the Judgment is presumed to be correct, and that
the burden of establishing its invalidity is upon
the party attacking it. Inasmuch as no transcript
of what transpired before the trial court ... has
been brought to us, it is to be presumed that the
preceeding supports the Judgment."
rr'his court in upholding the action of the trial court in
the Tucker Realty Inc., case (supra) recognized that the
granting of a judgment against a party solely for failure
to cooperate in discovery procedure was a stringent
measure. This court also recognized that the question
of whether the failure to comply with the discovery procedure was wilfnl and such as to justify the action taken
is primarily for tlw trial court to determine; and unless
it is shovrn that the court abused its discretion or its
action is without support the judgment should not be
disturbed. The defendant has made no showing that
the trial court ahnsed its disgression under the provisions of Rule 37 ( d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
or that its action was without support in granting judgment to the plaintiff inasmuch as no transcript of what
transpired before the trial court on November 29, 1966,
has ber~n brought before this court. Absent such a showing th<) ;jndgrm~nt on appeal should not be disturbed.
rrhe record before the court clearly sustains the actionf'
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visions of Rule 55(b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure were not applicable, as contended by defendant.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST DEFENDANT
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY PLAINTIFF
AS PRESCRIBED BY THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

Defendant urges under point 3 of his brief that
the lower court committed error in failing to set the
Default Judgment against defendant aside in that the
basis upon which such judgment was granted is technical
rather than substantial. Nowhere in the pleadings certified for record, more particularly defendant's Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment, has defendant raised
the issue which he seeks to raise here. As a general rule,
grounds of defense or opposition not asserted and relied
on in the lower court will not be considered or given
any weight on review.

It is undisputed in the record that the defendant

was served properly with Interrogatories under Rule 33
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that defendant
failed to answer them within the time prescribed. Further, defendant in his Motion to Set Aside the Default
.Judgment proceeded under section 78-51-36 of the Utah
Code as opposed to Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The trial court proceeded under Rule
37 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in striking
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damages.
As a general rule, punitive or exemplary damages
are awarded in addition to actual or compensatory damages and are in nature a punishment for the wrong done
by the defendant, and in cases of fraud or deceit, punitive or exemplary damages can be assessed in addition
to actual damages. (24 Am Jur. Fraud and Deceit S 222).
Awards of punitive damages have been allowed and
recognized by the Utah Courts ,and it is only when an
award of punitive damages is disproporitionate to the
award of actual damages will the court refuse to sustain
such an award. (Nance et al v. Sheet Metal Workers
International Association, 12 U. (2d) 233, 3G4 P. 2d 1027)
The defendant does not contend that the award of
punitive damages was disproportionate to the claim of
plaintiff in its Second Cause of Action. Nor has defendant shown, in the record before the Court, that the lower
Court did not comply with law in assessing damages
against defendant. In a case of a Default Judgment
where the action is for unliquidated damages, presumption on appeal, in absence of showing to the contrary,
iE that the Court below complied with law and properly
assessed the damages. (lValker Brothers v. Continental
Insitrance Co. of New York, 2 Ut. 331). The lower court
proceeded properly under Rules 55(a) (1) and 55(b) (1)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in awarding punitive damages against defendant in that the claim of
plaintiff was for a sum certain and was supported by
written instrurneuts. Under these circumstances the pro-
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POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT
OF PLAINTIFF FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHEN
IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST
DEFENDANT.

Defendant, for the first time in the proceedings
of the case before the court, seeks to attack the judgment
against defendant, pursuant to plaintiff's Second Cause
of Action, specifically the award of punitive damages,
as being improper. Defendant did not raise this issue in
his Motion to Set Aside the Judgment of plaintiff against
defendant, nor was this issue raised in defendant's Answer to plaintiff's Complaint. Thus it would appear that
the defendant waived this particular issue under rules
S(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
under familiar principles of appellant review, a point or
issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
(Tigeson vs. JJ!agna Water Co., 13 U. (2nd) 397, 375 P.
2nd 456.)
Defendant contends Rule 55(b) (2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure requires that the Court must take
proof of the value of a claim for unliquidated damages;
and that punitive or exemplary damages are within the
definition of unliquidated damages. As authority for this
position defendant cites the Utah case of Hurd v. Ford,
74 Utah 46, 276 pac. 908. A reading of the case cited
by defendant in support of his contention reveals that the
rnle set down by the Utah Spreme Court applies to actions for reasonable value of attorney's services and
has no application to an award of punitive or exemplary
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The action before the Court was commenced against
defendant on or about June 21, l9G5. Numerous extensions were afforded to defendant, by and through
his then counsel, Mr. l\Iurphy, by both plaintiff's attorneys, Mr. McRae and Mr. Fankhauser, in which to file
his answer to the Complaint, of plaintiff. The Answer
of defendant to plaintiff's Complaint was filed by Mr.
Murphy on or about February 7, 1966, only after Mr.
Murphy was given ample opportunity to examine all
documents in writing upon which plaintiff's action was
based. The withdrawal of l\Ir. Murphy came at precisely
the time plaintiff attempted to put the case at issue
and to reach a termination of the long pending litigation
by serving Interrogatories upon defondant. This situation clearly appears to be one that would come within
the contemplation of the Utah Court in deciding the
\/anCott v. Wall case (Supra) by refusing to give the
statute the construction contended by the defendant and
stating,
" ... It might be made the means of serious mischief if it could have such a construction."
It is submitted that the lO"wer Court did not error
m refusing to grant defendant's Motion to Set Aside
the Judgment of plaintiff against defendant where such
Motion was based upon plaintiff's noncompliance of Section 78-51-36 U.C.A. (1953) in that the withdrawal of
defendant's counsel was voluntar~T and the provisions of
the quoted statute had no application to this case.
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to practice in the Conrts and docs not apply to situations
\\'here a voluntary withdn1Yrnl of counsel, for any reason
occurs.
In a lat0r Californ;a ca::;c, De Recut Corp. v. Dunn,
242 Pac. 93G, 42 ALR 1:513, the Court quotes the New
York law which reads yirtually tl1e same as the Utah
law in that the need for advising the defendant to
appoint new counsel only is reqnired where the attorney
shall cease to act or shall be put out on the role of
attorney. In other words, the fact that the attorney withdraws from the case in point but is not disqualified from
vracticing law within the state, does not require notice on
the part of plaintiff to the defendant to appoint new
counsel or to appear in person.
In a New York case, Hendry v. Hilton, 127 N.Y.S.
2d 454, in which the attorney was discharged by the
client, the New York Court made the following statement in discussing the N cw York statute, which is identical in most respects to the Utah statute, to-wit:
"That section (240) does not relate to the removal or suspension of any attorney from the
case, or his disability to proceed therein, when
such removal, suspension or disability is caused
by the voluntary act of the attorney or client or
both. This section relates solely to a removal,
suspension or disability which is involuntary,
which is personal to the attorney, and which
effectually prevents him from continuing to act
- assuming his ·willingness to continue. It connotes a force nojeure, . . . "
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apply where a11 attorney merely 1cithdra1cs from a case,
and docs not wholly cease the pm ct ice of law. (Emphasis

added.) The Supreme Court discussc's the section of law
in question in the YanCott case a11d also examines decisions of oth0r states ckaling with identical sections of
their own laws. The Utah Supreme Court, in quoting
from a Michigan case, said:
"In Coon v. Plyrn011th Plank Road Co., 32 l\Iich.
248 it was contended, as it is here, that the withdrawal of the attorney took from the court the
right to proceed with the trial of the case. l\Ir.
Justice Cooley, after stating the contention of the
appellant, and after setting forth the Michigan
statute, which is like ours, in the course of the
opinion said:

'l:V e do not understand this to apply to a case

where a practicing attorney for any reason declines to go on with a particular case while still
continuing in practice. It might be madf~ the

means of serious mischief if it could have a construction. rrhe plain meaning of the statute is to
provide for cases in which the attorney or solicitor, by reason of death, disability, or other
cause, has ceased to practice in the court. His
refusal to proceed in a JHtrticular case is not ceasing to act as such attorney or solicitor, . . . . ' ".

(Emphasis added).

The court cl<•arly indicates that tlH~ statute in qm•stion is to apply to situations in whieh the attornev. ' hv
reason of death, disability or otlic·r cans<', has ceased
.,

5
counsel for plaintiff to take any action with respect to
giving notice to the defendant to appoint another attorney where the attorney for the defendant had withdrawn
from the case voluntarily ·withont disqualification or
disability.
Section 78-51-36 U.C.A. (1953) provides as follows,
to wit:
"Notice to appoint snccessor.-When an attorney
dies or is removed or suspended or ceases to act
as such, the party to an action or proceeding for
whom he was acting as attorney, must, before
any further proceedings are had against him, be
required by adverse party by written notice to
appoint another attorney or to appear in person."

Defendant docs not dispute the fact that the withdrawal of Mr. Murphy was voluntary and not a result
of death, or the removal or suspension of Mr. Murphy
from the rolls as an attorney, or that Mr. Murphy ceased
to act or practice as an attorney at the time of the withdawal. Therefore, the withdrawal of Mr. Murphy does
not come within the provisions of the statute in question
and the requirement of notice contained therein did not
attach to plaintiff as contended by the defendant.
In an early Utah case, Va11Cott, et al, v. Wall, 53 U.
:282, 178 P. 42, the Utah Supreme Court in considering
a case in which defendant fired his attorney and directed
him to withdraw from the case, stated that the provisions
uf the alJove quoted section of the Utah Code did 7iot
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ample opportunity at that time to confor with his client,
the plaintiff, concerning the n'cgmst of Mr. HadlPy.
Plaintiff's attorney, E. H. Fankhauser, uot;fied defendant's attorney, Skphcn :M. Hadley, on January 9,
1967, by letter that he would Le unable to stipulate to
the setting aside of the Default Judgment to plaintiff
against defendant. :Mr. Hadley then filed a Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment on plaintiff against
defendant, on or about January 12, 19G7. This l\fotion
was not noticed for hearing by defendant l!ntil May, 1967.
Defendant admits receiving Notice of the ·withdrawal of his counsel, James A. Murphy, the Notice of
\Vithdrawal having been mailed to defendant at 530 East
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the same address to
which all future Notices were mailed by plaintiff. ( J
Affidavit of defendant paragraph No. 1.)
ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST DEFENDANT
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 78-51-36
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS AMENDED.

It is the contention of plaintiff-respondent that the
only issue to be decided upon appc~al it-> whether or not
the provisions of Section 78-51-3G TT.C.A. (1953) rtq11ired
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tiff or plaintiff's counsel, after such mailing to the last
kno-wn address of defendant at 530 East Fifth South,
Salt Lake City, Utah. That the Notice of Hearing of the
Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and enter a Default Judgment against deft>ndant was in fact subsequently forwarded to the defendant. (f. Motion and
Judgment by Default and Notice and mailing certificate
therein.) ( g. Tl1e Order and mailing certificate contained therein.)
Defendant engaged other counsel, Stephen M. Hadlc·y, who contacted plaintiff's connsel, E. H. Fankhauser,
on or about December 6, 1966, with regard to the Default
.Tndgment entered against defendant. Mr. Hadley represented to plaintiff's counsel, E. H. Fankhauser, that
he had been contacted by the defendant with regard to
tlte Judgment entered against defendant by plaintiff and
that he was inquiring as to the nature and extent of said
action. Mr. Hadley represented to plaintiff's counsel,
at that time, that he did not know if he would represent
the defendant and would notify plaintiff's counsel at
~ome future time. J\.f r. Hadley, as defendant's attorney,
again contacted plaintiff's attorney, by letter, dated December 20, 1966, requesting that plaintiff's attorney
stipulate to the setting aside of the Default Judgment
ol plaintiff against defendant. Defendant's attorney
then assumed that plaintiff's attorney agreed in writing
to stipulat<-~ to the setting aside of such Default J udgment; however, defendant's attorney was mistaken in
that plaintiff's attorrn•y, E. H. Fankhauser, had not had
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ing, to commence snit against defendant for non-payment of such purchases and repairs to defendant's airplanes; and for a check drawn by defendant, payable to
plaintiff's assignor, drawn against insufficient funds.
DISPOSITION IN Lff\VER COURT
A default Judgment was granted plaintiff against
defendant in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County for defendant's failure to answer
Interrogatories propounded and served upon defendant
by plaintiff in compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The defendant, pursuant to provisions of
Chapter 78-51-36, filed a Motion to have the Default
Judgment against defendant set aside, and the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow presiding, denied defendant's
Motion.
The appellant-defendant appealed from the Order
of the said Court denying defendant's Motion to Set
Aside the Judgment of plaintiff against defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is not entirely in agreement with
the Statement of Facts set forth in the appellant's brief.
'l1he Motion of plaintiff filed on or about November 16,
1966, to Strike Defendant's Ansvver and enter a Default
Judgment against defendant and N oticc~ of Hearing on
said Motion was mailed to defendant and his former
attorney, Mr. Murphy, and ",ras never returned to plain-

